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Abstract—Progress in generative modelling, especially gener-
ative adversarial networks, have made it possible to efficiently
synthesize and alter media at scale. Malicious individuals now rely
on these machine-generated media, or deepfakes, to manipulate
social discourse. In order to ensure media authenticity, existing
research is focused on deepfake detection. Yet, the very nature of
frameworks used for generative modeling suggests that progress
towards detecting deepfakes will enable more realistic deepfake
generation. Therefore, it comes at no surprise that developers of
generative models are under the scrutiny of stakeholders dealing
with misinformation campaigns. At the same time, generative
models have a lot of positive applications. As such, there is
a clear need to develop tools that ensure the transparent use
of generative modeling, while minimizing the harm caused by
malicious applications.
We propose a framework to provide developers of generative
models with plausible deniability. We introduce two techniques to
provide evidence that a model developer did not produce media
that they are being accused of. The first optimizes over the source
of entropy of each generative model to probabilistically attribute a
deepfake to one of the models. The second involves cryptography
to maintain a tamper-proof and publicly-broadcasted record of
all legitimate uses of the model. We evaluate our approaches
on the seminal example of face synthesis, demonstrating that
our first approach achieves 97.62% attribution accuracy, and
is less sensitive to perturbations and adversarial examples. In
cases where a machine learning approach is unable to provide
plausible deniability, we find that involving cryptography as done
in our second approach is required. We also discuss the ethical
implications of our work, and highlight that a more meaningful
legislative framework is required for a more transparent and
ethical use of generative modeling.
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, humans have forged content. In 1777,
counterfeit letters were crafted to make it look like General
Washington did not want to fight against Great Britain [1].
Computer software such as Adobe Photoshop has long made it
possible to edit photos in realistic ways. The advent of artificial
intelligence and machine learning (ML) has exacerbated the
issue. For example, recent progress in generative modeling
pushes feasibility of forgery into the realm of video, while also
enabling sophisticated image forgery at scale. Some negative
applications of generative modeling have been discussed in the
media: revenge pornography [2], misinformation campaigns
by politicians [3], fake journalism [4], [5], and impersonating
company executives for profit [6]. Beyond individuals that are
directly targeted by the forged content, societal consequences
include a growing lack of trust in content shared electronically—
affecting all forms of human communication.
It is attractive to develop detection schemes capable of
automatically identifying and flagging content that was machine-
manipulated; we collectively call such content deepfakes
through the remainder of the paper. This would enable social
media platforms like Facebook to remove deepfakes without
having to manually check each suspected post [7]. One may
even consider applying ML to the very problem of detecting
deepfakes. However, this is unlikely to lead to a solution
capable of robustly identifying them: given access to tools
for detecting such content, the algorithms used to create
deepfakes can learn to produce even better content. For example,
generative adversarial networks (GANs), a common type of
generative models, are designed around the core idea of
training a generative model by optimizing an objective which
rewards defeating a detector (or discriminator) of fake content.
Additionally, ML-based deepfake detectors are vulnerable to
adversarial examples [8] which can be found using generic
approaches [9], [10]. Even in the face of progress in generative
modeling, manual forensics is still capable of distinguishing
content manipulated by a machine. Yet, automating this process
is unlikely to yield robust results.
To make progress on this front, we tackle this pressing
social issue through a different lens and seek to provide
developers of generative models with plausible deniability. That
is, we design mechanisms that, given an image, allow a model
developer/owner to plausibly claim that they did not produce
such an image using their generative model. We introduce two
approaches for doing so. The first characterizes the mapping
learned by each generator between its source of entropy and the
media that it produces. Given an image and a set of candidate
generators, we formulate an optimization problem to attempt to
reconstruct a random seed which could have led each generator
to produce the image. Our analysis suggests that, with high
probability, a seed is best reconstructed on the generator which
originally produced the image, even if the recovered seed is
different from the seed originally used. This yields a signature
which forensics experts can use to aid their investigations to
attribute the origin of deepfakes.
Next, we study the robustness of this attribution mecha-
nism in the face of adversaries. We find that deepfakes can
be manipulated post-generation to increase the difficulty of
reconstructing the corresponding seed. This limitation makes
it difficult for our approach to attribute deepfakes to specific
generators with strict guarantees of integrity. Our approach
is nevertheless less sensitive to perturbations crafted by an
adversary than prior work on detecting deepfakes [11]. However,
we show that certain GANs can generate any image as long
as they are provided with sufficiently high-entropy inputs.
This, in turn, means that when strict integrity is required,
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an attribution mechanism cannot be relied upon to provide
plausible deniability.
Thus, we conclude by discussing a second, complementary
approach which is not based on ML, but instead leverages cryp-
tography to support attribution with strict integrity guarantees.
We describe how a model developer can keep a tamper-proof
record of all the seeds they used in the past and publicly
broadcast it to obtain plausible deniability later when suspected
of having generated a given image.
To summarize, our contributions are:
1) We define attribution of synthetic images to generative
models and reason about its theoretical and practical
feasibility (§ III).
2) We discuss ethical implications of GAN attribution
techniques (§ II) and develop a realistic threat model
for GAN attribution (§ IV-A).
3) We propose (§ IV) and evaluate (§ VI) a seed
reconstruction approach to assist forensics in the
attribution of synthesized samples to a specific GAN,
when relaxed integrity is permissible.
4) To show our approach cannot be solely relied upon to
provide plausible deniability to model developers, we
study its robustness to post-generation manipulations
of deepfakes. We experiment with unbounded pertur-
bations, both non-adversarial (§ VI-B) and adversarial
(§ VI-C).
5) When strict integrity is needed, we introduce a
cryptography-based solution which allows a model
developer to obtain plausible deniability by having
it publicly broadcast a hash of all of the seeds they
used as inputs to their generative model (§ VII).
Before we dive in the technical details, we first discuss the
ethical implications of our research in the following section;
this area raises a number of important societal questions.
II. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While our paper introduces techniques designed to address
some of the issues raised by deepfakes, it is important to pro-
actively consider how these techniques will be used in practice
as well as understand what their limitations are.
Correctness: As highlighted in our work on StyleGAN
and StyleGAN2 in § III-D, some machine-manipulated content
produced by generative adversarial networks (GANs) are
difficult to attribute. This may occur when different generators
are trained with similar datasets and architectures for instance.
To avoid a false sense of security, we take care in our evaluation
to consider both false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) rates
when attributing a deepfake to a specific generator. Different
stakeholders will pay more attention to the former (e.g., social
media platform) or the latter (e.g., a court analyzing evidence).
For this reason, we argue in § VII that in some cases model
developers will have to resort to more traditional operational
security to achieve plausible deniability.
Unintended uses: While this is not the intended use
case, our technology could be used by state actors to justify
censorship of legitimate content shared by humans. We hope
that by bringing this issue to the attention of our community,
potential victims will be better informed of the risks involved
when using generative ML to evade censorship.
Bias: As our approach relies on the underlying GANs
for attribution, it may underperform when some of the GANs
themselves are unable to generate media from certain pop-
ulations because of limitations with their training algorithm
and/or data. This may lead to an unintended lack of fairness
in attribution results of our seed reconstruction approach.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Generative models differ from the more commonly known
ML classifiers in a number of ways. Typically, a classifier is
trained in a supervised manner to map semantically meaningful
samples from a high-dimensional space (e.g., images) to a
small number of classes (e.g., a label corresponding to a
specific object in an object recognition task). Instead, generative
models are trained in an unsupervised manner and map a low-
dimensional random vector called the seed to a semantically
meaningful sample that belongs to a high-dimensional space.
More precisely, generative models are trained to model a data
distribution pdata as follows: a prior ps is defined for the random
distribution of seeds. The generative model then maps seeds
sampled from this prior s ∼ ps to the space of semantically
meaningful samples by computing the output of a generative
model G(s). The goal of generative modeling is to train a model
G, which when fed with different seeds s ∼ ps, synthesizes
samples x such that it may seem like x ∼ pdata.
Like the rest of ML, generative modeling has benefited
from advances in deep learning. While a survey of generative
modeling is outside the scope of this work, we refer readers
to the tutorial by Goodfellow [12]. Progress in generative
modeling has opened the door for exciting applications. For
instance, a piece of a machine-generated painting was sold
for $430,000 at an auction [13], text and synthesized photos
can now be bidirectionally translated [14], and 3D models
can be generated from a single 2D image [15] to name a few.
Two prominent techniques for generative modeling include
variational autoencoders (VAEs) [16], [17], [18] and generative
adversarial networks (GANs) [12], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23].
We focus on the latter approach since (i) GANs have seen
widespread utilization in generation of (human-perceived) high-
quality and high-resolution synthetic media such as images [24],
videos [25], and audio [26], and until very recently [18], VAEs
were unable to match the quality of media produced by GANs;
(ii) despite their numerous useful applications, GANs are also
the basis for most of the approaches behind deepfakes [11],
[27] owing to their ease of adaptation to variants of pure image
synthesis that are commonly employed in deepfake creation
like inpainting [28], style transfer [29], or face swapping [30].
A. Primer on GANs
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) consist of a
generator G and a discriminatorD. The generator, parameterized
by ϑ(G), takes a latent variable (i.e., seed) s ∈ IRd as input,
and outputs an observed variable x ∈ IRm1, where x = G(s).
The discriminator, parametrized by ϑ(D), takes an observed
variable x ∈ IRm as input, and outputs a score D(x) ∈ IR that
1IRm is also referred to as X, the space of images
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quantifies the probability that x was synthesized by G. Both G
and D have a cost function JG and JD respectively that they
aim to minimize:
JD = Ex∼pdata [−logD(x)]+Es∼ps [−log(1−D(G(s)))] (1)
JG = Es∼ps [log(1−D(G(s)))] (2)
Although both JD and JG depend on ϑ(G) and ϑ(D), the gen-
erator and discriminator can only control their own parameters
while minimizing their respective cost functions.
In this paper, we are primarily interested in GANs for image
generation. Specifically, the generator outputs synthetic RGB
images given latent variables. The discriminator takes either real
or synthetic images as input, and outputs a score that classifies
them as either real or synthetic. During the training process,
the generator tries to trick the discriminator by producing
seemingly realistic images, whereas the discriminator aims to
distinguish between real and synthetic images to counter the
generator. Note that the GANs we study here are already trained
to convergence and we simply use them to generate synthetic
samples without performing any update to either ϑ(G) or ϑ(D).
B. Attributing deepfakes to GANs
Recall that in the introduction we outlined how the problem
of detecting content that was machine-manipulated is ill-defined
and unlikely to yield advances towards mitigating deepfakes in
practice, because better detection is likely to spur progress in
generation. Indeed, we saw in § III-A how the GAN framework
itself integrates a detector for fake content—the discriminator.
Instead, we assume that the sample x is already known to be
fake and focus on the problem of attribution.
We define attribution of a sample to a generator as the
post hoc association of this sample to the generator model that
originally generated it. Using the notation above, if x = g(s)
for a seed s ∼ ps, then x is said to be attributed to g. Given
an artificial sample s and a set of generative models G =
{g0, g1, ..., gn}, we say that the attribution was successful if
the sample is attributed to the original model and not any other
model. Here we assume that the model which generated the
sample x is within the set G. In practice, our seed reconstruction
approach from § IV ranks different candidate models, so we
consider the attribution successful when the model in G which
generated the sample x is ranked first. Note how the problem
of attribution can be recast as a classification task under the
ML terminology (see for instance [11]), where each class
corresponds to the index i ∈ {1..n} of the generator model
gi ∈ G. We use this analogy later to evaluate the robustness
of our attribution mechanism to deepfakes specifically crafted
by adversaries to mislead attribution.
Our proposed definition of attribution goes back to the
authenticity property in classical computer security literature;
we are authenticating data using knowledge of the generator
that produced it. Authenticity is defined as a combination of
three properties: integrity; freshness; and authorship by a right
principal [31]. Whilst this paper largely considers the principal
question, we must understand integrity, and the implications
it has on the broader problem of plausible deniability when
dealing with deepfakes. We describe two scenarios here:
1) Strict attribution: When integrity is strictly guaranteed,
only a sample x (e.g., image) which was produced by a
specific GAN g should be attributed to g. The process
needs to favor precision: the smallest perturbation to
a sample and/or model parameters should lead to the
attribution process failing for x and g.
2) Relaxed attribution: On the other hand, integrity can
be enforced in a relaxed manner, akin to malleability,
where one wants attribution to model g to succeed
even if the sample x was perturbed after it was
generated by model g. This covers cases where
recall is of importance—small changes should not
lead to an incorrect attribution. In this setting, it
becomes essential to define what small means and
limit the perturbation for which the attribution process
is expected to be tolerant, e.g., within an l∞-ball.
Both scenarios described above have real-life applications.
The former considers liability cases, where artificial content
should only be attributed to the generator that produced them.
For example, imagine a GAN designed to generate videos of
humans that was fine-tuned by an offender to generate child
abuse materials. In such a scenario, creators of the human-
generating GANs should not be held liable for the fine-tuned
GAN, but rather the offender should be prosecuted. The latter
case considers digital forensics and digital right management
infringement cases. For example, one might want to prove
that GAN-produced content is copyrighted and transformations
applied to the content (as in research into watermarking,
fingerprinting, and general information hiding [32]) should
not disrupt attribution. Transformations can range from being
adversarial to random, and include different encoding schemes.
In this paper we tackle both problems stated above.
C. Why is it possible to attribute synthesized samples to GANs?
It is not immediately clear that attribution should be
possible in the first place; if multiple GANs were able to
converge perfectly (i.e., model the data distribution pdata
exactly), it should be theoretically impossible to attribute
a sample x to one of these GANs. Indeed, GANs learn
to approximate a data distribution pdata by continuously
interacting with a discriminator whose role is to measure how
far synthetic samples, generated by the generator, are from the
data distribution pdata. In the limit of unlimited samples from
pdata and unbounded model capacity (i.e., enough neurons to
approximate any function), different GANs solving the same
task should learn to produce indistinguishable synthetic data
according to some distribution pG , such that pG = pdata. Yet, in
reality the optimization problem being solved exhibits multiple
optima—datasets are noisy and only partially describe the
data distribution pdata at hand, whereas imperfect generator
architectures end up describing data manifolds only to a certain
extent. This makes it difficult for GANs to converge exactly
to the underlying data distribution, as the training procedure
approximates the optimization problem and is susceptible to
artifacts of learning such as the initialization of the model’s
parameters at the beginning of training for instance. All together
this leads to GANs that are intrinsically biased.
In turn, attribution comes down to attributing a depiction
of a bias, i.e., generated contents, back to the generator’s bias.
The bias can come in multiple forms. For example, Figure 1
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Fig. 1: Synthetic face generated by StyleGAN2.
Fig. 2: StyleGAN architecture with two generator input vectors:
style A and randomness B. AdaIN is short for Adaptive
Instance Normalization. Image adapted from [33].
shows a StyleGAN2-generated face. The generator learned the
characteristics of a human face and generates a highly-realistic
synthetic face. However, we observe in the magnified insert
that the generator produced an individual to the right of the
artificial face and populated it with human-like features, yet
failed to reconstruct the ear which should be in this location
of the image. Similarly, it failed to reconstruct the neck of
the individual to the left. In another instance, StyleGAN can
often be recognised by droplet-like artifacts in the generated
images [34]. Bias can also take less recognisable format and
come in the form of a frequency distribution [11]. These are
examples of biases that attribution attempts to capture in order
to differentiate across different generators.
Capturing and attributing bias is something that humans
inherently do—we are capable of attributing content in the
domains of speech, music, art and even use of language. For
example, a human art amateur is able to roughly determine the
era in which a painting was created by observing the style of the
drawing; with proper training, human experts can also attribute
an art piece to its creator by authenticating signatures (such as
strokes) that belong to individual artists. In a similar vein, here
we aim to develop techniques to automatically capture biases
of media generated by different GANs.
D. Limits of attribution
There are practical limitations to attribution which we
identify later through our evaluation in § VI. These practical
limitations arise from cases where GANs are similar. One
can see how two quasi-identical GANs with an insignificant
difference in a single weight would learn the same or near
identical biases and make attribution difficult. Here, we provide
an analytical argument as to why attribution with strict
integrity—per the definition in § III-D—is not always possible.
This observation holds even in the setting where GANs converge
to different synthetic distributions upon completion of training.
Our analytical example constructs a GAN architecture such
that any arbitrary synthetic image can be attributed to it. This
would mean that an adversary could have any synthetic image
misattributed to the developer of this GAN architecture.
We generalize the observation of Abdal et al., which showed
that one can configure StyleGAN in a way that it produces an
arbitrary image [35], to draw the conclusion that other types
of GANs can also be fed seeds that lead them to generate an
arbitrary image. The reason why this is possible lies in one
of the secondary goals of GAN training. A generator model
should not only produce realistic synthetic samples which could
have been drawn from the data distribution pdata, it should also
produce diverse synthetic samples. Otherwise, the generator
will exhibit failures such as mode collapse [36]: it will default
to generating synthetic samples that are close to training images
it learned from. In addition to the seed required at the input of
the generator, many modern generator architectures promote
diversity by injecting randomness into all layers of the network,
often up to the last layer. Here, we show how this randomness
allows the generator to synthesize diverse content, with the
unfortunate consequence that an adversary could, in the limit,
force generators to synthesize an arbitrary image. In this setting,
attribution with strict integrity is not possible.
Figure 2 shows the architecture of a StyleGAN [33]. We
refer the reader to StyleGAN’s implementation [37] for more
details. The first architectural element promoting diversity
is the style parameter A = {Aγ ,Aβ}, which is derived by
applying fully-connected layers to the seed s. For instance,
in our experiments on face generation, the style parameter A
is used by StyleGAN to exert control over the face styles,
including the presence of glasses, age, or the face’s orientation.
A second source of entropy is provided to each layer to further
promote diversity. Each layer’s input xi is combined with a
weighted random input B, before applying Adaptive Instance
Normalization (AdaIn in Figure 2) to enforce style A, per:
xi = ReLU(xi+B ·wB)
xi+1 = AdaIN(xi,A) = Aγ
xi − µ(xi)
σ(xi)
+Aβ
(3)
If one is able to control either the source of randomness
B or the style A being fed to the last layer, the model can
be forced to output any arbitrary sample. To see why, observe
how an attacker could set Aγ,i = 0 and Aβ,i to a target image.
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This will result in the generator synthesizing the target image.
The same effect can be achieved by carefully setting the value
of B: Equation (3) can be inverted to produce an image of the
adversary’s choice.
E. Plausible deniability
In light of this discussion, we turn back to our motivation
for attribution. The logical conclusion is that strict integrity
(see § III-D) for the attribution of a deepfake cannot be
solely obtained by analyzing the manifold learned by each
generator. In § IV and § VI, we will introduce and evaluate an
approach that is nevertheless able to achieve relaxed integrity.
The lack of strict integrity guarantees could however lead to
GAN developers refraining from sharing their GANs to prevent
misuse and avoid any repercussions. For example, MIT was
recently pressured to remove an image dataset over the abusive
data and labels inside of it [38]. A recent challenge ran by
Facebook illuminated the significant complexity of deepfake
detection [39], whereas in this paper we describe why detection
is deemed to fail in the long term. Thus, we propose that in
settings where strict integrity is needed, we move away from
detection and attribution to instead provide plausible deniability.
Despite apparent problems with plausible deniability in the
real world such as with Anti-Money Laundering and Know
Your Customer regulations [40], it does help to identify a
responsible party and stop outright abusive behaviour. We argue
that similar legislation is needed to frame the deployment
of ML systems. In particular, plausible deniability helps tilt
the asymmetric relationship between legitimate and malicious
uses of generators in favor of legitimate users. Currently, an
attacker can use modern anonymity-preserving technology to
hide their identity online, whereas it is harder to anonymize the
process of generation and the generated data itself. We believe
that, through attribution, methodology described in the paper
contributes to transparency and auditability around the use of
generative modeling. This naturally allows for an ethical user
of generative technology to help in a responsible manner: if
developers of generative technology have responsibilities to
support the ability to provide plausible deniability, then this
could make malicious behaviour less easy to engage in. This
would overall improve the status quo around deepfakes.
In attribution, we rely on a trusted third party to attribute
the synthetic example to a generator. This could be for instance
a law enforcement agency investigating the use of a deepfake.
The law enforcement agency has a set of suspected generators
and performs attribution with or without participation from
the different model developers. This detailed forensic analysis
could for instance help ‘traitor tracing‘. Instead, when it comes
to plausible deniability, the model developer is responsible for
providing evidence that they did not generate the deepfake.
This class of approaches will alleviate some of the possible
repercussions faced by model developers when they release
generative models, so long as all legitimate uses of the model
are willingly and transparently monitored. If this level of
accountability is put in place, this makes it easier to provide
strict integrity—per the definition in § III-B—because the model
developer can easily capture the state of random inputs in
addition to the synthetic example itself. We discuss such an
approach in § VII.
IV. ATTRIBUTION WITH RELAXED INTEGRITY
We now introduce our seed reconstruction approach for
attribution in the relaxed integrity setting. We first describe the
threat model our approach is designed for.
A. Threat Model
We consider a white-box adversary with knowledge of our
approach. This means the adversary knows the details of the
attribution mechanism introduced in Section IV-C1 and also the
set G of GANs we will consider as candidates for attribution.
As far as adversarial capabilities are concerned, the adversary
cannot control the sources of randomness (i.e., the random
initializations we bootstrap seed reconstruction with, or the
style parameters we provide to generators). This is a standard
assumption, similar to the ones made in cryptography research:
sources of randomness in GANs share some similarity to the
concept of keys in cryptography.
Adversaries can only control and manipulate the synthetic
image which they intend to use as a deepfake for nefarious
purposes. We consider a series of adversaries with increasing
ability to perturb deepfakes generated by a GAN to evade
attribution. Choosing the perturbations we want our attribution
to be robust to is not trivial because it involves the broader
context our attribution mechanism will be deployed in. One
could argue that only the original synthetic images should be
correctly attributed to the model since any modification added
to the image means that the image is no longer generated by
a GAN exclusively. In this sense, the problem of robustness
analysis should not exist as long as the attribution methods
work well on original images. A similar problem arises in
the copyright area where the call was left to the judges to
determine whether the modification of the original work should
be treated as fair use or copy right infringement e.g., [41], [42].
Nevertheless, we take a worst-case perspective and evaluate
the robustness of our approach to unintended and adversarial
manipulations of the deepfakes in addition to confirming
that reconstruction works on original deepfakes. This is to
demonstrate that the method can be useful in the real world
to assist forensics experts investigating deepfakes created by
adversaries attempting to defeat attribution, and despite the
various transformations an image may go through online (e.g.,
it may be compressed when uploaded to a social network
platform). Specifically, we consider:
• Non-adversarial manipulations of the image applied as
it is transmitted between its generation and attribution.
This includes compression, cropping, and rotation.
• Adversarial modifications of the image (i.e., adversarial
examples) where adversaries actively seek to fool
attribution. We use the Fast Gradient Sign Method [43]
and adapt the Carlini&Wagner [44] attack to our
problem to produce deepfakes that increase the error
of our seed reconstruction approach.
B. Reconstructing seeds to attribute deepfakes
We assume that a given image can only be generated by
a single GAN. Though this assumption may not be provable
in theory, as we show in § III-D and Equation 3, we find that
this assumption works well in practice (see § VI-A) because
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Algorithm 1: Deepfake attribution algorithm
Input: Synthetic image x, set of generators
G = {g0, g1, ...gn} and distance function d
for all generators g ∈ G do
for i ∈ {1, · · · ,m} do
/* Initial random seed selection */
s = rand()
/* Randomness needed for generators */
R = rand()
/* Minimising distance of a
reconstruction to a target image */
s′ = argmin
s∈Rd
d(g(s, R),x)
d[g][i] = d(g(s′, R),x)
/* Find the minimum distance among all seeds
*/
dg = min(d[g])
/* Find the generator that corresponds to the
minimum distance of all generators */
g′ = argmin
g∈G
dg
return g′
the image is more likely to be regenerated by the original
generator. Ideally, if the generator function were to be invertible,
we could determine the seed and therefore claim attribution.
However, this is not possible because deep neural networks
are non-invertible. This is due to some of their architectural
components: e.g., activations such as the Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) lose information (when their inputs are negative) and
cannot be inverted. Researchers began investigating the design
of neural architectures for classification, which are invertible by
design [45], but this work will not be applicable to generative
models. Indeed, recall our discussion of generative modeling
in § III, a generative model maps a low-dimensional input (the
seed) to a high-dimensional output (the synthetic image). This
is unlike classifiers, which generally map a high-dimensional
input (the image) to a low-dimensional output (the label).
This suggests that the invertibility of generator functions faces
additional challenges compared with classification. Thus, we
focus on seed reconstruction without invertibility, as we discuss
in the next section.
C. Seed reconstruction algorithm
Given a synthesized image x and a set of generators G, our
algorithm reconstructs a seed for each generator that would
lead it to synthesize x, i.e., ∀g ∈ G we search for a different
s such that g(s) = x. Reconstruction here refers to a directed
search through the latent space of a generator. The search
is initialized with a random seed. An optimizer then uses the
similarity between the g(s), the synthesized image of the current
seed, and x, the target synthetic image, as a loss to direct the
search over the space of possible seeds. We then compare the
similarity of each synthesized image (from each seed) with the
original image x. Attribution is determined by the most similar
synthesized image to the original image x, where we use a
distance function to determine similarity.
1) Reconstruction: The goal is to discover a seed that a
generator could have used to generate the target synthetic image
Fig. 3: Relaxed attribution approach reconstructing a deepfake.
x. Reconstruction can be formalized as finding a member of
the preimage of x for g, i.e., a seed s such that g(s) = x. We
reformulate this into an optimization problem as follows:
sg = argmin
s
d(g(s),x) (4)
where g(s) is the synthetic image recovered by generator g
and d is a distance function to compare the recovered synthetic
image to the target synthetic image x. We explain how to
choose a distance in § IV-C2. The optimization problem in
Equation (4) can be solved with gradient descent with respect
to s because g is a differentiable neural network so the overall
distance computation is also differentiable. In practice, we use
a variant of stochastic gradient descent commonly employed
to optimize over neural networks: Adam [46]. We randomly
initialize s and configure the optimizer to perform a fixed
number of gradient descent steps (see illustration in Figure 3).
We make two observations: (i) we are not trying to reconstruct
the original seed s that generated the synthetic example x,
which is shown later to be difficult (refer§ VI-A), and (ii)
we may obtain multiple reconstructed seeds if we run our
optimization algorithm multiple times with a different random
initialization. In the following, we refer to each of these runs
as a reconstruction attempt. We record the final reconstruction
distance d(g(s),x), which is used later to infer attribution.
2) Distance Function: The distance function d in Equa-
tion (4) measures the difference between the recovered synthetic
image and the target synthetic image. The choice of distance
function d : X×X −→ R is two fold: (i) the function should
be differentiable and favor numerically stable symbolic gradient
computations so we can optimize over a smooth loss surface,
and (ii) the function should capture semantics of the images
and reflect human perception as much as possible.
We introduce an effective distance function as `2-feature.
The function is defined as ||f(x) − f(g(s))||2 where f is a
feature extraction function: we extract a feature map from both
the reconstructed and the target image, before computing an
`2 distance over these features. Using a pre-defined feature ex-
tractor was shown to be a powerful measurement of perceptual
similarity [47]. Compared with shallow metrics like Peak Signal-
to-Noise Ratio or Structural Similarity (SSIM) [48], using
deep learning based features has the advantage of capturing
high-order image structures that are more similar to human
perception. This facilitates the reconstruction process because
the seed space is explored more efficiently by the optimizer
when the distance function captures such image semantics.
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In practice, we utilize one part of a pretrained Inception-
V3 [49] network to extract feature maps. Starting from 299×299
inputs, we extract the Inception-V3 network from the first
inception block (referred to as Mixed_5d layer [50]), which
outputs a 35×35×288 feature map for each input. This layer
balances feature abstraction and granularity. When necessary,
we bi-linearly resize images produced by the generator to match
the feature extractor’s input size.
3) Attribution: Once we obtain a set of reconstructed seeds
for each candidate model g in the set of generators G, we need
to compare these seeds to attribute the synthetic image x to one
of the generators. We need to ensure that the comparison is done
over quantities that have comparable range and dimensionality.
This ensures that we do not favor any of the generators due
to their architecture. Hence, we use the final reconstruction
distance achieved by each generator, d(g(sg),x), where sg is
the seed returned by the reconstruction process as defined in
Equation (4). When we run multiple reconstruction attempts
for the same model, we only consider the attempt that led to
the seed sg with the smallest reconstruction distance for the
generator. Taking the minimum rather than averaging over all
reconstruction attempts ensures that we are more robust to
outliers caused by optimization imperfections resulting from
the non-convex nature of the problem. Thus, we attribute x to
generator gx according to:
gx = argmin
g∈G
d(g(sg),x) (5)
We also considered recording s,x, d(g(s)) for each intermediate
step of every reconstruction attempt and using this information
to further enrich the attribution decision. In practice, we
however find that selecting the model with the smallest
reconstruction distance at the end of the reconstruction as the
attributed model for a target image is simpler and sufficient.
4) Evaluating Attribution: The performance of our relaxed
attribution algorithm can be evaluated by generating a dataset
of synthetic images. In § V and VI, we design a dataset where
we synthesize images using three GANs for face generation.
Because we generate the images ourselves, we label them with
the ground truth attribution. We then evaluate the performance
of our relaxed attribution algorithm by calculating the accuracy
between this ground truth label and the output of our algorithm.
We also report confusion matrices to visualize the relative
performance of attribution on each GAN.
V. DATASET COLLECTION AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Before we evaluate our approach, we created a dataset
from modern GAN architectures capable of generating high-
quality and high-resolution images of human faces. We release
our experimental code at https://github.com/cleverhans-lab/
deepfake_attribution to facilitate reproducibility of our results,
and comparison with follow-up work on attribution.
A. Dataset collection
To obtain the synthetic images we need for our experiments,
we utilize three state-of-the-art generative models (GANs):
• ProgressiveGAN [51] trained on CelebA-HQ data [51]
produces synthetic human faces with progressively
growing resolution up to 1024×1024 pixels.
• StyleGAN [33] and StyleGAN2 [34] compose networks
that map random seeds into latent vectors before feed-
ing them as styles to subsequent layers to exert specific
control over attributes of the synthesized outputs. Both
GANs are trained with the FFHQ dataset [33].
Our implementation of these models is based on the official
implementation provided by the authors of each paper in a
public repository. We also use the pre-trained weights provided
with the code to ensure that each GAN architecture was
trained exactly as the authors intended. We note that the seed
vector’s dimensionality is 512 for all models, where each vector
component is a real number.
Using each of the three models described above, we generate
2000 synthetic faces for a total of 6000 faces. Each image has
1024×1024 RGB pixels with a human face in the center as
illustrated in Figure 13. For StyleGAN and StyleGAN2, we
set the truncation rate to 0.7. The truncation rate balances
the diversity and quality of generated images by rescaling the
deviation of feature values from its center; a value closer to 1
will result in more diverse, but lower quality images. During
dataset generation, we disabled all other sources of randomness
to ensure that the only source of the randomness is the seed.
B. Experimental setup
For each of the 6,000 images in our dataset, we attempt
reconstruction (ergo attribution) with all 3 generative models.
For each of the corresponding 18,000 seeds to be reconstructed,
and we attempt this reconstruction with three different random
initializations for each of the 18,000 seeds to be reconstructed.
This results in 54,000 reconstruction attempts.
We use the attribution approach described in § IV-C1. In
our experiments, we used the Adam optimizer to minimize
the objective in Equation 4 and set its learning rate to 0.1,
with no explicit learning rate decay or schedule. For each
target image and its 9 reconstructions (three models and three
random seeds per model), we only retain the reconstructed
seed which achieved the smallest reconstruction distance to
determine attribution as described in § IV-C1.
In line with our threat model from § IV-A, we evaluate the
attribution process against adversaries applying perturbations
that make it increasingly more difficult to attribute the resulting
modified deepfake:
1) Benign setting: here, we attribute images directly
synthesized by a generator and left unperturbed.
2) Non-adversarial modifications: we consider compres-
sion, cropping, and rotations. Some of the modifica-
tions are unbounded in the sense that they apply large
changes to the image (as measured by an `p norm)
3) Norm-bounded adversarial examples: we use the
Fast Gradient Sign Method [43] and adapt the Car-
lini&Wagner [44] attack, to adversarially modify
the deepfake within an `p norm bound. We modify
the attack objective to maximize the reconstruction
distance rather than the cross-entropy as done in the
attacks originally proposed by the original authors.
Our implementation is written in TensorFlow with
Python3.7. Due to the large computational cost, we distribute
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experiments on a cluster with 480 GPUs: each reconstruction
attempt runs independently in a job on one NVIDIA T4 GPU
with three CPU cores and 10GB of RAM.
VI. EVALUATION OF SEED RECONSTRUCTION
The objective of our evaluation is to understand the efficacy
of the relaxed integrity approach. Specifically, we wish to
understand if the relaxed integrity approach:
1) is able to successfully attribute synthesized images in
a fully benign setting, with no modifications?
2) is able to successfully attribute synthesized images in
the presence of non-adversarial modifications?
3) is able to successfully attribute synthesized images in
the presence of adversarial modifications?
4) agrees with that of human experts?
From our analysis, we draw the following insights on the
performance of the relaxed attribution method:
1) We observe that in a fully benign setting, the relaxed
attribution method can successfully attribute 97.62%
of 6000 images with as few as three seed reconstruc-
tion attempts (i.e., different random initializations) per
image. Attribution accuracy increases with the number
of reconstruction attempts (see § VI-A).
2) We observe that image manipulations that result in
small structural changes (e.g., JPEG compression) do
not impact accuracy of our approach. However, manip-
ulations that induce large changes (e.g.,, mirroring an
image) negatively impacts attribution accuracy unless
they are considered during attribution (see § VI-B).
3) We observe that norm-bounded adversarial examples
negatively impact attribution accuracy when the per-
turbation is large (see § VI-C).
4) We conduct a user study and confirm that humans can
attribute reconstructed images to the target deepfake
with high accuracy (89.81%). Our relaxed attribution
algorithm agrees with human judgement 93.7% of the
time (see § VI-D).
A. Benign Setting
Recall that for each synthetic image, we verify if the image
is generated by one of the 3 candidate GANs. Confusion
matrices are shown in Figure 4. Out of 6000 images, 143
are attributed to the wrong GAN, which represents an error
rate of 2.38%. Out of the 143 failure cases, 120 of them are
StyleGAN synthesized images, 22 StyleGAN2 generated, and
1 ProgressiveGAN generated: attribution is more difficult on
certain GANs. A visual inspection led us to find that most
failure cases were due to reconstructions being stuck at a local
minima on the correct GAN for all reconstruction attempts.
An example of a diverged optimization is shown in Figure 27.
With more reconstruction attempts (i.e., with more random
initializations for the seed reconstruction algorithms), this can
be mitigated, as shown in Figure 5.
Interestingly, there is no bijection between generator’s
synthesized outputs and the seeds used to generate them. To
see this, we measured the `2 difference between the initial seed
si and the reconstructed seed se after optimization completes.
Out of 18,000 reconstructions on 6,000 images with 3 seeds
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Fig. 4: Normalized confusion matrix on 6,000 images, 2,000
from each GAN. The overall error rate is 2.38%.
per synthesized image, none of the reconstruction attempts
resulted in a smaller `2 difference between the reconstructed
seed and the seed that was originally used to synthesize
the image upon completion of the optimization procedure—
despite the corresponding synthetic image being close to the
target deepfakes. The average initial difference between the
candidate seed and the original seed is 1.99, whereas the
average difference after the reconstruction completes is 13.00.
We find that seeds after optimization tend to take larger values,
compared to random seeds which are typically sampled from
a Gaussian distributions. This confirms that the goal for the
relaxed attribution algorithm is not to recover the original seed,
but to find collision seeds that produce similar synthetic outputs.
Follow-up work may also find that additional constraints to
the problem in Equation (4) improve the similarity between
reconstructed and original seeds.
B. Non-Adversarial Manipulations
Manipulations discussed here are those that are not inten-
tionally made to avoid detection/attribution.
1. JPEG Compression: Images circulating online can often
be converted into different formats for efficient distribution and
storage. This process is lossy and often introduces perturbations.
To evaluate our method’s performance in such cases, we utilize
JPEG compression. Specifically, we compress target images
using OpenCV with varying compression ratios (50%, 70%,
90%, 100%), before using them as input to our attribution
methodology. Our algorithm achieved an error rate of 4.3%,
4.6%, 4.6%, 4% respectively, which shows that JPEG com-
pression has little impact on attribution accuracy. This could
be explained by the down-scaling operation before feature
extraction during the reconstruction procedure, which effectively
reduces any artifacts introduced by compression.
2. Image Augmentation: Apart from compression, we apply
several image augmentation strategies obtained from the open-
source albumentations library [52]. We list them all
in Table I. Note that these augmentations do not change
the semantics of the image. We summarize some salient
observations:
• Gaussian Noise and Random Rotate may leave notice-
able artifacts indicating the image has been augmented.
However, as stated in previous sections, repeating the
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Fig. 5: Increasing the number of reconstruction attempts
decreases the attribution error, before it plateaus.
Augmentation Error Rate(3 seeds)
Error Rate
(10 seeds) Description
Gaussian Blur 5% 2.3% Gaussian blur with kernel sizebetween 3 - 7
Gaussian Noise 12.3% 9% Gaussian Noise N (0, 0.01)
Mirror 25.3% 23% Flip each pixel’s x axis long thecenter line
Random Crop 14.3% 9.7% Crop image on both axes between100% - 90%
Random Rotate 5.7% 3% Rotate image between 0-5 degrees
Zoom In 10.3% 5.7% Crop the center 90% on both axes
TABLE I: Augmentations for non-adversarial manipulations
attribution process with more random initializations to
reconstruct the seed will increase success rate.
• Mirroring an image significantly decreases the at-
tribution’s accuracy (to less than 75%): GANs are
unable to reconstruct asymmetric faces. This effect
is particularly pronounced on the StyleGAN model.
An effective countermeasure is to run the attribution
process twice with both the flipped and non-flipped
images but doubles computational overhead.
C. Adversarial Manipulations
The previous section details manipulations made to deep-
fakes without the explicit intent of having the attribution process
fail. In this section, we thus focus on adversarial perturbations.
Recall that the attribution process has two steps. The first is to
reconstruct the image given multiple seed initializations and
generator architectures, and the second to choose the generator
whose reconstructed image is closest to the synthetic image
under consideration. We attack both steps in our evaluation:
the first attack below (seed space) seeks to make it harder for
the optimization process to converge, the second (image space)
manipulates the distance metric used for attribution, whereas the
third attack crafts images that are difficult to attribute by treating
the overall attribution process as a black-box classifier. To be
conservative, we analyse robustness in a white-box setting with
full knowledge of both the generative models and the feature
extractor used to measure the distance d in Equation (4).
1. Adversarial Perturbations in the Seed Space: Adversaries
may try to find seeds that generate hard-to-reconstruct images. If
successful, images produced by such seeds can not be effectively
reconstructed on the original model despite the absence of any
further manipulations. We use the FGSM method to generate
adversarial latent seeds: the adversary considers the generator
and composes it with the feature extractor, treating the two as
a single model. The adversary can then perturb the seed (under
an `∞ constraint) to form an adversarial seed which leads the
generator to output a synthetic image that exhibits a feature
representation far from the original deepfake.
Results are shown in Figure 6a. We find that this strategy is
not very effective. Because the adversary is perturbing the seed
and not the image, this makes it easier to find an adversarial
seed which does not result in noticeable artifacts in synthetic
images. This however comes at the expense of introducing
artifacts that alter the high level characteristics of the image:
Figure 8 shows an example image that gradually changes its
characteristics as the adversarial perturbation on the seed space
increases in magnitude (as measured by the `∞ norm of ε).
We did not find that switching to a more powerful optimization
procedure such as the one used in the CW attack helps. For
this reason, we consider next an attack in the image space.
2. Adversarial Perturbations in the Image Space:
This class of adversarial perturbation instead considers the
feature extractor only. Our intuition is to make it easier to
optimize for an effective adversarial perturbation if we only
have to differentiate through the feature extractor rather than
the generator combined with the feature extractor (as done
in our attack in the seed space previously). This means that
we first generate a deepfake using a generator, then we take
this image and look for a perturbation that will maximize the
distance between the adversarial image’s feature representation
and the original deepfake’s feature representation.
Here, we also first consider the FGSM to find such an
adversarial perturbation for varying `∞ constraints ε. Figure 6b
suggests that our method is robust under small values of ε, but
will eventually deteriorate to random guessing as ε increases.
However, it is worth mentioning that because the `∞ norm only
bounds the maximum change per pixel, artifacts introduced by
the perturbation are more easily noticed by a human observer.
We show the same deepfake perturbed with ε = 0.0588 and 0.1
in Figures 7a and 7b respectively. Perturbations of this size are
discernable by humans, especially on the background region for
each image. We also calculate the structural similarity (SSIM)
between the perturbed deepfake and the original deepfake to
evaluate human perception more accurately; as ε increases, the
SSIM decreases.
We find that the `2 variant of the Fast Gradient Method is
unsuccessful in this setting as shown in Figure 6b, possibly
due to the formulation our loss for this attack. For this reason,
we turn the formulation by Carlini and Wagner (CW) [44]
and adapt it to our problem. We have two goals—minimize
the perturbation under the `2 norm and maximize the feature
difference. We use c to weight the two goals, as shown in the
following equation:
argmin
δ
‖δ‖2 − c · d(x,x+ δ) (6)
In Figure 6c, we highlight the results we obtain using pertur-
bations generated with the CW-based approach. As before, the
attribution process is robust to a small perturbation (i.e., small
values of ||δ||2) and degrades as the perturbation size increases.
We formulate a few hypotheses to explain why crafting
small adversarial perturbations against this attribution process
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(a) Adversarial perturbation (FGSM) in the seed
space: ε is `∞ bounded.
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(b) Adversarial perturbation (FGM) in the image
space: ε is `∞ or `2 bounded.
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(c) Adversarial perturbation (CW) in the image
space: δ is `2 bounded. Numbers plotted in the
figure represent values of c.
Fig. 6: Performance of relaxed attribution algorithm against three types of adversarial perturbations (denoted ε or ||δ||2).
(a) Generated with FGSM
(`∞) with ε = 0.0588. Attri-
bution error = 0.27. SSIM =
0.874.
(b) Generated with FGSM
(`∞) with ε = 0.1. Attribution
error = 0.47. SSIM = 0.719.
(c) Generated with adapted
CW (`2) with ||δ||2 = 100.
Attribution error = 0.11. SSIM
= 0.883.
(d) Generated with adapted
CW (`2) with ||δ||2 = 260.
Attribution error = 0.11. SSIM
=0.657.
Fig. 7: Adversarial examples generated by FGSM and adapted
CW perturbation, both in the image space. Perturbations are
visible, but requires zoom in. We present the attribution error
as well as SSIM.
could be more challenging than directly attacking a ML
classifier. First, generator models map a low-dimensional seed
space to a high-dimensional image space. This changes the
nature of the optimization problem solved to find adversarial
perturbations. Second, the distance metric we use to compare
two images uses an `2 norm which averages out some of
the perturbations introduced and decreases the impact on the
attribution’s error rate.
(a) Generated with FGSM on
the seed space with ε = 0.0169.
(b) Generated with FGSM on
the seed space with ε = 0.039.
(c) Generated with FGSM on
the seed space with ε = 0.078.
(d) Generated with FGSM on
the seed space with ε = 0.196.
Fig. 8: Adversarial example generated by FGSM on seed
space. The character in display has significantly changed with
increasing ε.
3. Transferability attack on black-box attribution: To
contrast our efforts with prior work [11], we design a simple
experiment which treats the attribution process as a black-box
classification model. We then craft adversarial examples that
evade the classifier and test how likely they are to evade not
only the classifier, but also our attribution mechanism from
§ IV-C1. In other words, we test how transferable adversarial
examples crafted on substitute models are to our black-box
attribution process. Our intuition here is to show that it is
easier to find informative gradients on the classifier than on the
attribution process itself which involves a non-differentiable
optimizer. This helps us more rigorously evaluate the worst-
case performance of our attribution process in the presence of
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a motivated adversary.
We train a substitute classifier on 24,000 synthetic images
(8,000 from each GAN); the classifier comprises of 4 convolu-
tional layers, and its objective is to classify each image to one
of the 3 GANs (ideally the one that created it). The classifier
reached over 99.8% accuracy on a test set composed of 3,000
images. We then attacked the classifier using FGSM and CW
perturbations respectively.
Results for both `∞ and `2 perturbations are shown in
Figure 9. The classifier is extremely sensitive to adversarial
perturbations; the CW perturbation is particularly effective and
is able to reduce the classification accuracy to 0%. On the
other hand, when we transfer these adversarial examples to
our attribution method they are ineffective. This means that
transferability-based attacks that use small perturbations (as
discussed earlier, when the perturbation is too large, attribution
fails as expected) fail to transfer. The attribution accuracy only
drops by 1.7% in the case of CW perturbation, and less than
15% in the extreme case of FGSM perturbation (for large values
of ε in the `∞ regime).
D. User Study
Since the relaxed attribution approach relies on recon-
structing the image from a random seed and measuring
distances between the reconstructed and synthetic images, we
believe it is interesting to study whether such an exercise
can be carried out by humans as well i.e., humans should
have comparable attribution accuracy as our approach. It is
particularly interesting to compare humans performance in
measuring distances between the different reconstructed images
produced by our seed reconstruction algorithm and the original
deepfake image that the reconstruction targets.
Experimental Setup: We carried out a user study on Amazon
Mechanical Turk, where we recruited 122 participants to
identify which of the reconstructed images (using 3 random
seeds, and 3 GANs) is visually most similar to the synthetic
target. Note that the synthetic image (i.e., the target) is selected
randomly, and the order of the reconstructed images are shuffled
for each round. An example task provided to the participants can
be found in Figure 11. As the figure illustrates, reconstructed
images from the same GAN are composed into one row and
each participant was asked to complete 120 rounds. This study
was approved by our Institutional Review Board, and each
participant was compensated 2 USD for their efforts. The user
study interface is designed with OTree [53].
To ensure the quality of data from participants, each round
has a probability of 5% being a placebo round where one row
has three exact copies of the target. We calculated a participant’s
average placebo round accuracy and discarded the data from
participants that achieved less than or equal to 80%, leaving
us 111 valid participants in total. The results and analysis
discussed below are pertinent to the valid participants only
and we simply refer to them as participants. In total, our
data collection led to 3246 synthetic images receiving 5710
votes from the participants, with an average of 1.76 votes per
image and standard deviation of 1.03. In order to investigate
the correlation of attribution between the algorithm and the
participants, we select 631 synthetic targets that received at least
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Fig. 9: Robustness of the classifier and our attribution algorithm
to adversarial examples crafted on the classifier. Adversarial
examples are generated with the FGSM and CW attacks,
constrained using `∞ norm (top) and `2 norm (bottom).
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Fig. 10: Confusion matrix for participant and model attribution
results. There is a strong correlation between participant
and machine learning model attribution decisions although
participants performed slightly worse than the model.
Fig. 11: Screenshot of one round of the user study. Each round
randomly selects a target image and shuffles group order.
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three votes from all participants (regardless if the attribution is
correct or not).
Results: On average, across all images shown, participants
achieved 89.81% attribution accuracy with standard deviation
of 5.84%. In comparison, our approach (relaxed attribution)
achieves 97.6% attribution accuracy (refer § VI-A). On 631
images that have received at least 3 votes, we calculated the
majority votes for each with participant-algorithm matching
matrix shown in Figure 10. Out of 631 images, human and
our method agree 93.8% of the time. This indicate a strong
association between human judgement and the decision metric
we use. Noticeably, no single image has been attributed
incorrectly by the algorithm but correctly by the participants
at the same time. We believe our algorithm can be used
collaboratively with human forensic experts to provide a
higher attribution accuracy. This also paves the way to provide
explainability for the attribution algorithm, as decisions are
made through visual reasoning. We leave a more rigorous
explainability analysis to future work.
VII. STRICT INTEGRITY ATTRIBUTION AND PLAUSIBLE
DENIABILITY
While it may be possible to use a ML-based solution to
attribute deepfakes in the relaxed integrity setting, we believe
that strict integrity requires a non-ML solution to avoid an arms
race between the development of attribution mechanisms and
attacks against these mechanisms. It is theoretically possible
that, given an image, one can find a seed that will result in a
generative model generating that image almost perfectly. We
discussed this in § III-D. Thus, a malicious entity is likely to
be able to forge a seed which would result in a deepfake being
incorrectly attributed to an innocent model developer.
In this section, we instead turn to traditional techniques
from computer security literature to demonstrate how developers
of generative models can prove that they did not generate a
deepfake. Our goal is thus to achieve plausible deniability. We
discuss our proposed solution with the potential of legal action
being taken against model developers in mind.
Integrity in the security literature is usually achieved through
a combination of hash functions and cryptographic signature
schemes [54], [31]. We propose to adapt this idea to the problem
of deepfake attribution by having each model developer P use
a private key kP to keep an append-only log L of each seed s
(including any source of randomness such as the style vector
A we saw in our analysis of the StyleGAN architecture) used
to generate an image x, timestamp t, generative model g and
their corresponding hashes computed with hash function h.
P → L : {s,x, g, t, h(t||s||x||g)}kP
Later, when the model developer is suspected of having
generated a deepfake, they can prove their innocence by allow-
ing an audit of their log of seeds along with the corresponding
hashes and all affected computer systems. By re-computing
the hash of the suspected seed and comparing it to the stored
hashes, one can detect the smallest deviations to the seeds
themselves. Furthermore, given the non-invertible property of
hash functions, it is provably hard for the attacker to find a
seed that would map to the same hash value.
New	generated	content
Party	2Party	1
Tx0:	{s0,	x0,	gi,	t0,	h(t0||s0||x0||g||none)}k
Txn-1:	{sn-1,	xn-1,	gi,	tn-1,	h(tn-1||sn-1||xn-1||g||Txn-2)}k
Txn:	{sn,	xn,	gi,	tn,	h(tn||sn||xn||g||Txn-1)}k
Nodes	controlled	by	separate	third	parties
Storing	all	authenticated	generated	contents
gi
Fig. 12: High-level diagram of a ledger based solution to strict
integrity attribution.
It is apparent from the description of our proposed defense
that an attacker can still trick such a system if they manage
to overcome the append-only nature of the log. This makes
it particularly important to choose the relevant medium for
storing the log and corresponding hashes. In certain settings,
it may be acceptable to use appropriate legal mechanisms to
protect the interests of a company developing the generative
models (for instance, by having a law firm or a court store the
log and hashes for content generated by the company). If local
regulations do not make this possible, model developers may
turn to technology and rely on distributed forms of storage.
Transaction ledgers, also known as blockchains, are now a
recognised solution to storing data in a tamper-proof manner
both publicly and privately [55], [56], [57]. Blockchains have
already been used for managing integrity of real data. For
example,
• The United Kingdom has used them for real estate
ownership management [58] and is considering them
for storage of digital evidence [59];
• A large number of US states accept blockchain evi-
dence2 e.g. the state of Vermont passed an act stating
that ‘A digital record electronically registered in a
blockchain shall be self-authenticating pursuant to
Vermont Rule of Evidence.‘;
• The Hangzhou Internet Court in China has accepted
blockchain stored evidence (which involved acknowl-
edging its credibility and integrity) in a copyright in-
fringement case, and even started their own blockchain
where one can upload digital evidence [61].
In order to become a blockchain, the above construction has
to incorporate the following two elements: (i) the computation
and data storage is performed in a distributed fashion over
a pool of nodes, and (ii) every hash computation includes
a hash digest of past transactions (to keep track of history).
This way, no single party has control over the data or the
decision process, ensuring integrity of both data and system
2More information on other states can be found at [60].
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development over time. Figure 12 shows a high-level description
of the proposed solution to achieve strict integrity. A number
of separate companies, such as law firms, oversight committees
or non-profit organisations, run their nodes on the system
monitoring terminal access and production of sensitive artificial
content. By observing the distributed ledger over time and
recording what content are being produced, it is possible to
later claim plausible deniability and release information that is
stored and verified by a number of reputable sources.
The distributed nature of data and hash computations
increases the complexity for the attacker, they no longer can
disrupt data integrity through a single computer, but must
now circumvent at least half of the computation pool. Easy
recovery also makes it hard for the attacker—data is stored in
a distributed manner and hash calculation enables the pool to
identify where the attack data is being injected. The pool can
then detect precisely when it came under attack, find instances
where data was manipulated, highlight malicious activity, and
exclude both data and nodes from subsequent computations.
We argue that strict integrity attribution or plausible
deniability should be solved using immutable distributed
data structures such as permissioned blockchains and legal
instruments. Distributed append-only log or a blockchain should
be used to keep track of data by generator models with
sensitive content and utilise strict access controls. This way
misinformation attempts can get precisely attributed to the
producing party and traitor tracing can be done effectively.
That would enable companies to provide evidence that it was
not their systems that were abused and give them plausable
deniability. Blockchains also come with the beneficial by-
product of providing an effective way to prove authorship
of generated content in copyright infringement cases.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Methods for detecting if multimedia is authentic or synthe-
sized can broadly be classified into two categories:
1) The first is based on conventional image processing
techniques; synthesized (or altered) images do not
follow the same physical principles that authentic (or
real) images capture. For example, photos that are
captured through a camera’s optical system will result
in distortions such as misalignments in color channels.
Identifying such inconsistencies paved the way for
digital forensics [62].
2) The second category involves comparing noise levels
in certain areas of images to that of the whole
image [63]. Using deep learning techniques, one can
extract suitable features and learn a binary classifier
to distinguish between authentic and synthesized
images. The work of Wang et al. [64] achieves
high performance in distinguishing real images from
those synthesized by GANs despite being trained on
synthesized inputs from ProgressiveGAN [51] alone.
A detailed survey of the second category of approaches
is found in the work of Verdoliva et al. [65].
As detailed in the introduction, we seek to attribute deepfakes
rather than detect them. We explained how this is mainly
because detecting deepfakes is only likely to fuel advances
in the generation of more realistic deepfakes that become
increasingly harder to detect. Instead, with our two approaches
for attribution and plausible deniability, we seek to assist
forensics experts in their work.
Digital forensics is essential for many applications; in social
media platforms, providing evidence if media is synthesized
draws a clear distinction between moderation and censorship.
For example, Twitter has been labeling tweets that contain syn-
thesized content since February 2020 [66]. Additionally, such
an identification procedure also aligns with current regulations
in requiring explanation for machine-made decisions, such as
the GDPR framework in the European Union.
One way to attribute a synthesized image to the model
that generated it is to identify fingerprints that exist in
synthesized images [67]. Unlike prior work, Frank et al. [11]
analyse fingerprints in the frequency domain. However, such
fingerprinting techniques have been shown to not robust against
small image perturbations, or adversarial attacks [8].
IX. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have looked into attribution and plausible
deniability for deployment of synthetic content generators. We
find that ML is only a part of a large system design that is
required to be able to track how the technology is being used.
We show analytically and practically that as generation becomes
better, attribution becomes harder, up to a point where a sample
can be attributed to all of the models and is indistinguishable
from real data. Ultimately, this hints that attribution is not
just a computer science problem, but requires a solution
incorporating operational security, legal and ethical frameworks.
Furthermore, given the fragility of ML to adversarial examples,
it is imperative that humans should be able to inspect and
interpret the decision of a ML model.
In this paper we have presented one possible solution.
We showed that a synthesized image can be attributed to the
generator that produced it even in presence of noise. Further,
we find that the attribution performance is supported by a
human’s decision in 93% of the cases. Of the failed cases, we
find that more than half were because the method failed to
reconstruct the images even after three attempts. Yet, it is clear
that for attribution to be successful in the future, ML tools are
not enough. With fake images indistinguishable from real data,
information hiding, fingerprinting, and watermarking become a
necessity for both data sources e.g., [68] and models e.g., [69].
At the time of writing the paper, we find that there is little
guidance and clarity on ownership and liability of generative
modeling. Furthermore, there is little to no information on the
best practices to follow to avoid abusive behaviour. Unsurpris-
ingly the problem itself is not new. GPT-2 have been discussed
in similar light, where at first OpenAI refused to release the text
generative model, but later still made it public. They pointed
out that detection of generated content in language modeling is
a hard topic and that humans can be tricked by fake text [70].
Face-Depixeliser has been heavily discussed in the news in
context of ethics, racism and law [71]. DeepNude has been
developed to undress pictures of humans, and was found to do
so even for kids [72]. This is clearly unacceptable, and public
outcry led to closing of the project.
Lack of clear guidance around the ownership of generative
modeling also leads to situations where copyright law is
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challenged yet again. In an example, Damien Riehl and Noah
Rubin generated all possible 8-note, 12-beat melody combos
and released them to public under Creative Commons Zero
license [73].
Finally, we find that the GAN attribution problem is ill-
defined, because there exists a large number of transformations
that are semantically meaningful for humans, but are destructive
for GANs. In this paper, we presented a number of such
transformations including encoding, scaling, and flipping. In
the case of a face flip, humans will do as well as before the
flip, yet the attribution method presented in this paper will fail
(unless it is adapted), and so it should—the image has been
greatly modified and does not come from the data distribution
the GAN was trained on. Yet, the same will not hold true for
text generation—direction of text matters. This indicates an
intricate nature of domain specific transformations that must
be considered when designing attribution schemes, similarly to
watermarking [74].
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APPENDIX
A. MNIST
To validate the efficacy of the relaxed attribution method,
we also evaluated it on two generative models trained with
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TABLE II: MNIST attribution results.
DCGAN Brownlee Model
DCGAN-generated images 498 2
Brownlee-generated images 49 451
MNIST data to produce fake handwritten digits. This was to
ensure that our results are not specific to the face generation
task considered in the main body of the paper.
1) Implementation: MNIST, which is a handwritten dig-
its dataset that contains 60,000 training and 10,000 testing
images, was widely adopted in the initial developments of
GANs. We selected two models compatible with MNIST: the
DCGAN [23] [75] model contains 3 transpose convolution
layers in its generator; the Brownlee [76] model contains 2
transpose convolution layers in its generator, with a smaller
filter size in its generator. Input seeds to both models are
100-length float vectors. They also have similar discriminators
except the one in DCGAN model has a slightly large filter
size. We trained both models with Adam optimizer and 0.1 as
learning rate for 50 epochs.
2) Evaluation:
a) Generate Dataset: To evaluate our method on
MNIST-based synthesizers, we generated 1000 synthesized
images with random seeds, with 500 on each model.
b) Classification Method: Due to the simple nature of
MNIST images, we used the `2 difference between recon-
structed images and target images as the loss function for
reconstruction. For each target image in the 1000 image dataset
(500 for each model), we select 1 random seed to reconstruct
the target image on both models. Each reconstruction is done
with 500 optimization steps of Adam as the optimizer.
c) Results: For each target image, we select the model
that produces the smaller image difference during reconstruction
as the identified model. Our method achieved 94.6% classifica-
tion accuracy, with attribution results shown in Table II.
d) Additional Observations:
1) By observing loss curves, we noticed that when
reconstructing a target image on the model that
generated it, our method can always result in near
zero reconstruction image loss.
2) However, original seeds are unlikely to be recovered.
Even if the initial reconstruction seed is set to be
the original seed plus a small amount of noise
N (0, 0.0025), none of the original seeds were re-
covered in 1000 experiments. This means that finding
collisions in the seed space is somewhat easy.
3) Additionally, we observe that most failure cases
happen when the Brownlee model failed to reconstruct
the target but DCGAN produced a reasonable good
reconstruction. We speculate that due to more layers
in DCAGN, it has an advantage in reconstruction
power compared to the Brownlee model. Our method
is more suited to perform well when each model has
similar reconstruction power.
B. Reconstruction Samples
We plotted 4 synthetic targets and corresponding reconstruc-
tion bellow. The first three can be attributed successfully with
our relaxed attribution method, while the last one failed due
to diverged reconstruction on the correct model, StyleGAN in
that case. Attribution results are bordered with green.
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Fig. 13: Target (from Progres-
siveGAN)
Fig. 14: Reconstruction on Pro-
gressiveGAN
Fig. 15: Reconstruction on
StyleGAN
Fig. 16: Reconstruction on
StyleGAN2
Fig. 17: Target (from Style-
GAN)
Fig. 18: Reconstruction on Pro-
gressiveGAN
Fig. 19: Reconstruction on
StyleGAN
Fig. 20: Reconstruction on
StyleGAN2
Fig. 21: Target (from Style-
GAN2)
Fig. 22: Reconstruction on Pro-
gressiveGAN
Fig. 23: Reconstruction on
StyleGAN
Fig. 24: Reconstruction on
StyleGAN2
Fig. 25: Target (from Style-
GAN)
Fig. 26: Reconstruction on Pro-
gressiveGAN
Fig. 27: Failed Reconstruction
on StyleGAN
Fig. 28: Reconstruction on
StyleGAN2
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